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Abstract
We estimate an investors' demand model for hedge funds to analyze the potential im-
pact of leverage limits in the industry. Our estimation results highlight the importance
of heterogeneous investor preference for the use of leverage, i.e., 20% of investors prefer
leverage usage while others do not. We then conduct a policy simulation in which reg-
ulators put a cap on allowable leverage, as proposed by the Financial Stability Board
in 2012. Simulation results suggest that the 200% leverage limit would lower the total
demand (assets under management) for hedge funds by 10%. In particular, the regula-
tion would lead to lower investments in highly leveraged funds and to lower investments
in risky strategies, which, in turn, would reduce systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
The hedge fund industry has rapidly grown in the last twenty years, collecting approximately
2.2 trillion dollars in 2012 all over the world. One of the reasons for this popularity is that
hedge funds are under less regulation compared to other nancial products. This exibility
allows hedge funds to use aggressive investment tools such as (i) short-selling to prot from
the falling price of a stock, and (ii) leverage to multiply their investment and prot. As a
result, the hedge fund industry oers a unique opportunities for investors and collects a large
amount of assets. Moreover, hedge funds provide liquidity to the global nancial market,
because they trade assets constantly using such investment tools.
On the other hand, hedge funds may pose systemic risk { a failure of one large hedge
fund may aect not only its investors but also trading counterparties, creditors including
large nancial institutions, and nancial markets; thus creating negative externalities. As
a result, there has been several discussions pertaining to regulating hedge funds. In 1998
the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, known as a highly leveraged fund, caused
systemic risk and has provoked a policy discussion on regulating the hedge fund industry.
Moreover, the recent repurchase (REPO) market run in 2008 led to further discussions about
tighter regulation on hedge fund leverage. In 2012, the Financial Stability Board proposed a
direct regulation on the use of leverage. However, there is limited evidence of how and how
much this regulation would reduce systemic risk. There is also concern about the possibility
that this regulation would prevent investors from aligning their portfolios with their risk
appetite.
This paper empirically studies the trade-o between investors' demand for hedge funds
and systemic risk. In order to study the eects of hypothetical regulations which are not
implemented yet, we use a structural estimation method from the Industrial Organization
literature, conducting counterfactual simulations in the following two steps. First, using
hedge funds market share and characteristics data, we recover the underlying investor pref-
erence for hedge funds which is policy-invariant to leverage regulation. Second, using the
estimated model, we simulate how investors would change their choice of hedge funds under
hypothetical leverage regulation. We use these results to assess the eects of leverage regu-
lation on the hedge fund industry, in particular, how much investors would withdraw their
asset from the hedge fund industry and how much systemic risk would be reduced.
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The approach taken in this paper diers from the previous studies in that we model and
simulate investor choice to study the eect of regulation without controlled experiments.
This is due to the fact that there is no controlled experiment that enables us to identify the
eect of regulation in the past. Furthermore, the data which is available for this industry is
the fund-level data where we can observe their characteristics and their asset size (market
share). Due to limited data availability, we use the demand estimation framework developed
by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
Our estimation results highlight the importance of heterogeneous investor preference for
the use of leverage: 20% of investors prefer leverage usage while others do not under baseline
estimation. Using the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual simulations in which
regulators put a cap on allowable leverage at dierent levels. Our simulation results suggest
that investors would withdraw their assets from the hedge fund industry by about 10% in
the 200% cap case.1 However, the regulation would reduce potential systemic risk via the
following two channels: (i) highly leveraged funds would substantially lose market share and
thus the distribution of fund portfolio size would be more equalized across the industry, and
(ii) hedge funds using risky strategies that might cause large size failures would also decrease
their market shares. Thus, we conclude that the proposed leverage regulation would decrease
the investors demand for hedge funds, but reduce systemic risk to a great extent.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that studies the eect of leverage regula-
tion. In existing literature, hedge funds and their associated risks are broadly discussed. For
example, Aragon and Strahan (2012) show that the shortage of traders' funding liquidity
decreased market liquidity in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Dudley and Nimalendran
(2012) also nd that investors will suddenly withdraw from poorly performing funds if those
funds use more leverage and are less liquid. Though the existing literature mostly focuses on
hedge fund behavior directly, our model assesses the hedge fund regulation through investor
behavior, because hedge funds are just one type of nancial intermediary and thus their
behavior should reect investors preferences.2 The methodology we use is widely applied in
Industrial Organization literature, and Massa (2003) seminally applies the methodology to
study mutual fund choice in nance literature.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides summary
1We use the portfolio/equity ratio as the denition of leverage ratio.
2For example, if there are no fund ow from investors to credit hedge funds, they could not purchase
massive CDO during the 2008 nancial crisis.
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statistics and motivating facts for the modeling framework. Section 3 presents the model and
Section 4 depicts the estimation procedure. The estimation results are presented in Section
5. The eects of change in regulation are then analyzed by counterfactual simulation in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and Systemic Risk Measures
2.1 Data and Characteristics of Hedge Funds
The data mainly come from the Lipper TASS hedge fund database, which is one of the
most accurate representatives of the hedge fund universe. Compared to other databases,
the Lipper TASS database includes detailed fund characteristics such as use of leverage,
redemption restrictions, trading instruments, and so on. Therefore, this is one of the most
suitable databases for conducting the demand analysis. To avoid issues with survivor bias,
we use both live and graveyard funds. Also, we include the fund of hedge funds for that
is one of the popular strategies for investors. The sample period is from January 2007 to
December 2011. We annualize monthly data, as in Massa (2003) or Gavazza (2011). We
lter the data as follows: First we include the hedge funds whose domicile currency is the
US dollar to analyze investors behaviors in the US. Then, we exclude hedge funds that do
not report asset size, rate of return and fund characteristics. We assume that the alternative
investment option to hedge fund investment is the total nancial wealth not invested in hedge
funds in the sample, taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Annual
Flows and Outstandings issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
as Gavazza (2011) does. Table 1 depicts sample statistics. In the rest of this subsection,
we describe in more detail some important characteristics, such as leverage and redemption
restrictions, which are listed in Table 1.
Leverage One of the main features of hedge funds is the use of leverage. The use of
leverage in the Lipper TASS data is dened as the portfolio/equity ratio. If this number is
equal to one (100%), then the portfolio size is equal to the size of assets under management
(hereafter AUM), which is the amount of money for which the hedge fund has the right to
claim a management and/or an incentive fee. If this number exceeds one, then the hedge
fund manages more assets than what it originally had by using derivatives or borrowing
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Rate of Return 0.0026 0.027 -0.783 0.104
S.D. of Rate of Return 0.036 0.030 0 0.390
Minimum Investment (thousands) 1314 2527 0 50000
Management Fee (%) 1.431 0.858 0 20
Incentive Fee (%) 17.21 6.36 0 50
High Watermark 0.80 0.40 0 1
Leveraged 0.68 0.46 0 1
Max Leverage (%) 160.62 265.08 0 8000
Avg Leverage (%) 124.90 153.25 0 6000
Margin 0.33 0.47 0 1
Open End 0.46 0.50 0 1
Open to Public 0.25 0.43 0 1
Redemption Notice Period (Days) 45.47 28.59 0 180
Lockup Period (Month) 5.42 7.17 0 60
money from other nancial institutions and collateralizing some of the funds' assets.
Figure 1 shows the use of leverage in ordinary times, labeled as average leverage, and
historical maximum usage, labeled as maximum leverage. Around one-third of hedge funds
use leverage and some of them use extremely high leverage.3 If highly leveraged hedge funds
fail, creditors such as large banks or other nancial counterparties would take a large loss
and be destabilized. Therefore, highly leveraged funds can be considered a potential threat
to nancial stability.
Strategy According to Lipper TASS, there are three main categories of hedge funds. First,
\arbitrage" hedge funds aim to make prots by arbitraging mispricing in asset markets.
This category includes strategies called convertible arbitrage, xed income arbitrage, and so
on. Second, \directional" hedge funds aim to make prots from the direction of markets.
This category includes strategies called long/short equity, global macro, managed futures,
dedicated short bias, and so on. The main dierence between traditional funds and hedge
3This statistic on leverage usage coincides with an internal survey on European hedge funds by the
European Central Bank (2005).
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Figure 1: Leverage Usage
funds is that hedge funds use short positions and exposure to derivatives. Third, event driven
hedge funds aim to make prots using events such as mergers, restructuring and the failure
of rms. Furthermore, multi-strategy funds use several other strategies and funds of funds
invest in several other hedge funds. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of hedge funds in terms of
their disclosed investment strategy in 2007. The graph shows that \Long/Short Equity" and
\Fund of Funds" hedge funds are the predominant strategy in terms of number. However,
in terms of assets under management, their market share is smaller, and this suggest that
their asset sizes are smaller than those of funds that use other strategies, on average.
2.2 Measurements of Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is an ambiguous concept and dicult to quantify. Taking advantage of our
fund-level micro data, however, this study attempts to quantify the eects of regulation on
systemic risk by following two measures: (1) concentration, and (2) asset allocation for risk
strategies as well as the amount of macro-level assets in this industry.
Micro Measurement 1: Size Concentration One of the unique characteristics of the
hedge fund industry is its concentration. The largest 1% of funds manage more than 20% of
total assets in the industry. This feature becomes more prominent if we consider leveraged
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Figure 2: Number of Funds and Market Share by Strategy in 2007
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assets. To illustrate this concentration, we use the Herndahl-Hirschman Curve, inspired
by Herndahl-Hirschman Index(HHI) which is commonly used in the industrial organization
literature.
The left and right panels in Figure 4 show the market concentration with assets and
assets multiplied by leverage in the industry, respectively.4 We observe that both curves
skew downwards, implying that the top percentage of funds manage a large fraction of the
assets and leveraged assets in the industry. We focus on how these Herndahl-Hirschman
curves would change after the implementation of hedge fund regulation, as one of the systemic
risk measurements.
Micro Measurement 2: Asset Allocations for Risky Strategies Some particular
strategies typically use high leverage and these strategies are more likely to lead the fund to
go bankrupt with large losses. As pointed out by Ferguson and Laster (2007), Global Macro,
Fixed Income Arbitrage and Multi-Strategy were the main strategies behind past large-scale
failures, accounting for 33%, 30% and 28%, respectively. Therefore, the asset allocations for
those risky strategies might serve as a good measurement of systemic risk.
Figure 5 shows the shares of each strategy in terms of assets and leveraged assets in 2007.
4First, we sort existing hedge funds by assets or assets multiplied by leverage and divide them by the
total size to compute their density functions. Then, we can easily obtain cumulative distribution functions
by summing them up in ascending order. If we observe a 45-degree straight line in the graph, it implies that
every hedge fund has exactly the same amount of assets.
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Figure 3: Number of Funds and Market Share by Strategy in 2007
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Figure 4: Concentration of Hedge Fund Assets
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Note: The left panel shows assets under management, while the right panel shows assets under
management multiplied by leverage. We use the sample in 2007 and the number of existing
funds in 2007 is 772.
Risky hedge funds such as global macro, xed income arbitrage and multi-strategy account
for 21% of industry assets under management, though they account for much higher shares
in terms of leveraged assets due to the high use of leverage.
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Figure 5: Asset Allocations by Strategy in 2007
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3 Model
3.1 Overview of the Model
Our nal goal to examine the eects of a set of regulations suggested by the Financial
Stability Board. To do this, we are required to simulate asset distribution across hedge
funds (market shares) under regulations that have not been implemented yet, implying that
it is dicult to directly use standard regression analysis.5 Therefore, we use a structural
approach to tackle this problem, i.e., we recover the investors' indirect utility function by
modeling the investors' hedge fund choice problem, and then simulate how their hedge fund
choice would be changed under regulations.6
More precisely, since the data include yearly aggregate-level market share and fund-level
characteristics, we use a methodology developed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) in which they exploit the information contained in the market share.7 In their
5For example, suppose we specify a relationship between a fund's asset size (market share) and the average
leverage ratio, using a standard regression:
(asset size)j = 0 + 1(ave. leverage)j +   + j :
From this regression, we can infer is (marginal) eect of the average leverage ratio. Thus, if we want to know
the asset size for fund j whose average leverage is not aected by regulations, this model is silent (or we can
interpret zero change in asset size). However, our intuition tells us that this is not the case, because some
funds might be a substitute for fund j and those funds are (negatively) aected by regulations; thus, some
investors would invest in fund j. In order to have such reasonable `substitution patterns' across funds, we
need to model investors' behavior.
6In order to fully take into account the equilibrium eects, we also need to model hedge funds' behavior.
We discuss this issue in Section 6.
7Of course, if we had investor-level portfolio data, we could have used dierent approach. However, such
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methodology, each product is expressed as a bundle of characteristics. In our context, each
hedge fund is characterized by the past realizations of return, some redemption restrictions,
use of leverage, and so on. Then, we assume that each investor derives utility from these
characteristics of the hedge funds and invest in the fund that gives the highest utility. Since
we observe multiple years of market shares, we have some variation in the investors' choice
set. Intuitively, observing the relatively higher market share for some funds, we can infer
how investors evaluate the fund characteristics. In other words, we can recover the investors'
valuation for each characteristic of the hedge funds, using the variation in choice set as an
identication source.
This methodology has been extensively used in the industrial organization literature, as
well as in recent studies in nance, and has become popular in the last decade. For instance,
Massa (2003) uses this technique to recover investors' utility from mutual fund choice, and
Schroth (2006) studies rms' choice of an underwriter.8
3.2 Investors' Behavior
Let j denote each hedge fund and Jt denote a set of the existing hedge funds at time t,
i.e., Jt = f1; 2; 3;    ; Jtg. Each hedge fund is characterized by two sets of variables: (i)
past performances, frj;g=0;1; ;t 1, and (ii) a vector of observed characteristics, Xj. This
vector of observed characteristics, Xj, includes each fund's investment strategy, incentive
and management fees, area of focus and so on. To minimize notation, let 
t denote an
information set at time t, which is available for every investor:

t = f(rj; ;Xj)j2Jg=0; ;t 1:
Each consumer is now assumed to have a unit demand for hedge funds and choose one hedge
fund which gives the highest expected utility, given available information, 
t:
max
j2Jt
E[ui(rj;t+1)j
t]; (1)
data are rarely available and we only have macro-level market share data for this study. Importantly, one
of the prominent features of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) methodology is that we can still recover the
demand function from the data on market share and product characteristics, without having such investor-
level portfolio data.
8There are more studies using similar techniques.
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where ui is a utility function of investors.
If investors were able to perfectly foresight the fund performance, then they could invest
a fund which yields the highest return. In reality, however, there is an uncertainty and
they cannot perfectly predict fund returns. Investors typically predict future returns using
historical performances and observed characteristics, which are included in 
t. Thus, we
assume that the future returns can be expressed as a function of funds' historical performance
and characteristics:
~rj;t+1 = rj(rj;t;Xj); (2)
Notice that we do not impose any restrictions for fund returns. For instance, we do not
assume that fund returns follow AR nor GARCH process. We instead assume that investors
infer funds' protability from past performances and characteristics. Plugging this predicted
returns into the expected utility, labeled as equation (1), the investors' maximization problem
can be rewritten as
max
j2Jt
E[ui(~rj(rj;t;Xj))j
t]:
This specication is very intuitive: investors choose a fund based on historical performances
and characteristics of funds, using information available at time t. For estimation purpose,
we then approximate this utility function in a split of mean-variance utility:
E[ui(r(rj;t;Xj; jt))j
t] = 0;i + rj;t1;i + vj;t2;i +Xji + j;t + "ijt; (3)
where vj;t denotes the volatility of funds j at time t, j;t denotes the unobserved fund specic
eect at time t, and "ijt denotes a fund j specic random utility shock for investor i at time
t, respectively. First of all, this linear specication can be seen as one of mean-variance
type utility specications with some control variables, as the rst set of utility components
is indeed mean and variance of fund performances. Second, we incorporate one dimensional
fund specic unobserved eect, denoted by jt. In reality, even though the observed data {
performance and characteristics { are the same, two hedge funds would yield dierent returns.
This observation implies that there exist an unobserved but fund specic component for
predicting fund returns, such as managers' skill. Thus, we introduce fund specic unobserved
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term. The last component of the investors' utility is the random utility shock. In reality,
investors often interview hedge fund managers before making their investment decisions. At
this stage, even though two investors meet the same fund manager, they might have dierent
opinion and choose dierent funds as a consequence. This random utility shock term can
capture such heterogeneity.
In our specication, we further incorporate investors' heterogeneity by introducing ran-
dom coecients, i. This heterogeneous coecients vector allows investors to have dierent
tastes. For example, some investors who have higher risk tolerance should have higher 2;i,
compared to other investors who have lower risk tolerance. Or they might have dierent
beliefs regarding how hedge fund characteristics aect on future outputs, i.e., some investors
appreciate leverage usage more compared to other investors. These elements may generate
leverage lovers and haters. Therefore we assume the following parametric assumption for
each characteristics m:
i;m = 
o
m + 
u
mi;m; where i;m  N(0; 1) (4)
where om denotes the average valuation for the characteristic m, 
u
m denotes the standard
deviation for the valuation, and i;m is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable.
9 As we
saw in Section 2, the data suggest that non-negligible fraction of hedge funds use leverage
and there is demand for these funds, implying that some investors positively value the use of
leverage. Thus, even though investors value one of the characteristics { leverage { negatively
on average, some people who have a positive shock, i;m, can have a positive valuation of that
characteristic. Notice that the standard homogeneous coecients model can be expressed
as one of the special cases of this model by assuming um = 0 for every characteristic m.
Now, plugging the coecients vector, equation (4), into the utility function and dening
Xj;t = [1; rj;t; vj;t; Xj], equation (3), we can rewrite the utility function as
uijt = Xjt
o +Xjt
u
i + jt + "ijt;
where o = [o1 ;    ; oM ]0 and ui = [u1 i;1;    ; uMi;M ]0. Dene the mean utility, jt, as a
sum of two components, Xjt
o, and j, which do not depend on investor i specic variables,
and redene Xjt
u
i as the deviation from the mean, ijt. These expressions enable us to
9Alternatively, we can also express equation (4) as i;m  N(om; (um)2).
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rearrange the indirect utility function as
uijt = Xjt
o + j| {z }
jt
+Xjt
u
i| {z }
ijt
+"ijt;
= jt + ijt + "ijt:
Moreover, when investors do not choose any hedge fund but choose outside options, j = 0,
we assume that investors will obtain a utility of zero, 0t = 0, for normalization purposes.
In other words, ui0t = "i0t.
Assuming a Type I extreme value distribution for the disturbance term, the probability
that investor i chooses hedge fund j at time t is given by:
Pr(di;t = jjfXkt; kgk2Jt) =
exp(jt + ijt)
1 +
P
l2Jt exp(lt + ilt)
;
where di;t denotes investor i's decision to choose hedge fund j at time t. Therefore, summing
over investors' choice probability for fund j at time t, we can obtain the aggregate level
market share as
sjt =
Z
i2I
Pr(di;t = jjfXkt; kgk2Jt ;i)dF (): (5)
No Heterogeneity Case In this study, we assume there exists heterogeneity in investors'
preference. However, assuming that heterogeneity does not exist, we can simplify the model
and estimation procedure. First, the market share can be expressed as
sjt =
exp(jt)
1 +
P
l2Jt exp(lt)
; (6)
because now we assume um = 0 for all m. This equation straightforwardly implies that if the
mean utility level of hedge fund j increased, then the market share for hedge fund j would
also increase. Similarly, we can also calculate the market share for the outside option as
s0t =
1
1 +
P
l2Jt exp(lt)
: (7)
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Using the inversion technique developed by Berry (1994) { dividing both sides of equations
(6) and (7), and taking the logarithm { we can obtain the mean utility as
log(sjt)  log(s0t) = jt
= Xjt
o + jt: (8)
where the second equation is derived by the denition of jt. Therefore, we can estimate the
model with the standard regression technique, assuming jt as residuals. Moreover, for the
case of the nested logit model, equation (8) can be rewritten as
log(sjt)  log(s0t) =Xjto +  log(sj=g) + jt; (9)
where sj=g denotes the share within the same group.
10 Again, assuming jt as residuals, we
can use the standard regression technique.
It is impossible, however, to estimate the model by linear regression when we have some
endogeneity issues. Namely, if we believe that jt is correlated with some other variables in
Xj, linear regression estimates will be biased. Therefore, we need to use an instrumental
variables approach, which we discuss in Section 4.
4 Estimation
4.1 GMM-Type Estimation with Investors' Heterogeneity
We exploit an estimation method developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and
Nevo (2001). As we demonstrated in Section 3, if the model does not include heterogeneity
in investors' preference, we can estimate the model using a standard regression. However,
it is impossible to use this method, if the model includes heterogeneity, as in equation (5).
Therefore, we use simulation to obtain the market share:
sSjt(X; ) =
1
ns
nsX
i=1
exp(jt + ijt)
1 +
P
l2Jt exp(lt + ilt)
; (10)
10In a nested logit model, investors rst choose one category of funds and then choose a fund from that
category. The category can be a strategy or the location of headquarters etc, which could be arbitrary.
Moreover, the derivation for this equation is beyond the scope of this paper. Those who are interested
should see standard references such as McFadden (1974) and Berry (1994).
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by generating ns times random numbers for i, which enables us to calculate ijt. Since
we know the market share of each fund, we can estimate the parameter by minimizing the
distance between the observed and the predicted market shares:
min

ksSt (X; (X; ;o);u)  sDt k;
where sDjt denotes a j dimensional vector of observed market share in the data and  denotes
a set of parameters. Although this method is intuitive, this minimization is computationally
expensive and we commonly use the estimation procedure developed by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001), in which they use the orthogonality conditions between
the structural error term, , and a set of instruments.
As mentioned in Section 3, the structural error term, j is likely correlated with some
other observed variablesXj. In our context, j can be seen as the unobserved fund manager
skill for example. Then, we expect that a good fund manager will yield higher returns,
implying that j will be correlated with the rate of return. In order to take into account
such endogeneity, we use an instrumental variables approach. Specically, simulated share
equations (10) enable us to solve for (X; ;o), as we have Jt unknowns with Jt equations
for each year:
sS1t(X; (X; ;
o);u)  sD1t = 0
...
sSJt(X; (X; ;
o);u)  sDJt = 0
Then, we use a denition of j to obtain j, namely, j = j  Xjo. Finally, we use an
appropriate set of instruments, Zj, for product j so that we can use the moments conditions
of E[Z 0(u;o)]. More precisely, we minimize the following GMM objective function:
^ = argmin

()0Z 1Z 0();
where  = (u;o) and  is a consistent estimate of E[Z 0Z].
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4.2 Construction of Important Variables
Rate of Return In our study, we specify t as a year. Even though we observe monthly
returns and estimated assets for more than half of the hedge funds, we sometimes observe
quarterly or annual returns and estimated assets for other hedge funds. In order to use
all hedge funds' information, we aggregate monthly or quarterly data into annual data. In
particular, when we aggregate returns, we use the following standard formula to obtain
annual returns from monthly returns:
rj;year =
 
12X
m=1
(1 + rj;year;m)
! 1
12
:
For annual volatility, we calculate the variances of the monthly returns.
Market Share and Outside Option As Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo
(2001) point out, the denitions of outside option and the market share are crucial for
correctly estimating our model. In our study, the market should include the investors' point
of view. Therefore, in our study, we follow Massa (2003), who uses the Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States, Annual Flows and Outstandings, issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Using this information is equal to implicitly
assuming that investors are mostly from the US. 11
In this study, we do not specify the outside option explicitly. It may capture whole nan-
cial products in the US such as cash, equities, bonds, mutual funds, derivatives and so on.
Some of nancial products in the category of outside option may have similar characteristics
(e.g. leverage and riskiness) to hedge funds. However, these products generally do not use
high leverage and are still quite dierent with respect to redemption restrictions, information
disclosure, or openness to public.
It is possible to study the substitutability with other nancial products such as mutual
funds. However, this paper attempts to examine the substitutability (i) among hedge funds
and (ii) between hedge funds and other nancial products (an outside option). Therefore,
we abstract investorshedge fund choices from other asset allocation of their portfolios.
11Of course, we can also mimic Massa (2003)'s strategy where he uses `overall market capitalization' to
check the robustness of his results. This will be reserved for future research.
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5 Estimation Results
In this section, we provide estimation results for two dierent models: a logit and a random
coecients model. Table 2 shows the estimation results when we use `maximum leverage' as
the funds' leverage information, while Table 6 in the Appendix shows the estimation results
when we use `average leverage.' Comparing these two models, we observe similar results.
Therefore, we focus on explaining the results with maximum leverage in the following section.
In Table 2, the second and third columns show estimates and standard errors for the logit
specication where we do NOT include investors' heterogeneity, while the fourth and fth
columns show the results for the random coecients model where we include investors'
heterogeneity for leverage usage. We demonstrate the coecients and the standard errors
from the second to the fth rows.
Returns and Volatility As we expect, the past realizations of returns positively aect
and volatility negatively aect investors' utility, as shown in the second to seventh rows.
These results are intuitive; investors derive utility from good past performance, and disutility
from volatile performance. Not surprisingly, last year's realized volatility is not statistically
signicant for both specications. Thus, our estimation results suggest that investors are
tolerant of last year's volatility. We also need to emphasize that this part of the results is
quite robust for any specications. Moreover, we also included higher moments, skewness and
kurtosis, for testing the robustness of the results. However, these coecients are typically
not statistically signicant.12
Year and Strategy Dummies We include dummy variables to absorb year-specic and
strategy-specic eects. As for dummy variables for year-specic eects, it is very clear that
demand in 2008 is much lower than demand in 2007, which is the base year.13 For strategy
dummies, some strategies, including equity market neutral and global macro, are signicantly
dierent from the benchmark `other strategies,' which do not fall into any strategies listed
in the table.
12These estimation results that include higher moments are available on request.
13This is because the United States was severely aected by a nancial crisis caused by the bankruptcy of
the Lehman Brothers in 2008.
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Management and Incentive Fees For management and incentive fees, both coecients
are negative, which should match our intuition, although these are not statistically signi-
cant. We doubt that this lack of signicance is caused by lack of the variation in management
and incentive fees. Most of the funds set their management and incentive fees at 20% and
2%, respectively.
Leverage For leverage, if we assume that there is no heterogeneity for investors, our model
predicts that investors positively value leverage, on average. Interestingly, this result changes
when we include heterogeneity. In a random coecients model, investors value hedge fund
leverage negatively, on average, but standard deviations for the valuation are also huge and
signicantly dierent from zero. Thus, there exist some investors who prefer highly leveraged
funds to minimally leveraged funds.
To see this result more graphically, we simulate 10,000 heterogeneous investors in terms
of their evaluation of leverage, and demonstrate their distribution in Figure 6. In the right
panel, we demonstrate the distribution including 95% condence intervals { the atter line
corresponds to the distribution with the highest variance and the more skewed one corre-
sponds to the distribution with the lowest variance case.
Figure 6: Leverage Valuation of Simulated Investors
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Redemption Restrictions We include two variables that are related to redemption re-
strictions: (1) redemption frequency, and (2) lockup period. In our study, the unit of re-
demption frequency is a month (so it is not exactly frequent) and the coecients for this
frequency are positive in both specications, implying that investors more highly value the
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Table 2: Estimation Results 1: Maximum Leverage
Logit Model Random Coef. Model
Variables Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Constant -14.251 0.252 -14.231 0.465
Rate of Return t  1 14.483 1.750 14.474 2.874
Rate of Return t  2 13.463 1.845 13.656 3.040
Rate of Return t  3 9.622 1.967 11.159 3.099
S.D. Return t  1 -1.098 1.509 -1.122 2.569
S.D. Return t  2 -5.343 1.710 -5.456 2.863
S.D. Return t  3 -9.170 1.779 -8.561 2.789
Year Dummy 2008 -0.297 0.084 -0.124 0.133
Year Dummy 2009 0.090 0.098 0.208 0.155
Year Dummy 2010 0.041 0.098 0.183 0.157
Year Dummy 2011 0.088 0.107 0.205 0.166
Management Fee -0.064 0.034 -0.071 0.105
Incentive Fee -0.009 0.006 -0.017 0.012
Maximum Leverage - Mean 0.202 0.058 -1.118 0.109
Maximum Leverage - S.D. { { 1.289 0.331
Average Leverage - Mean { { { {
Average Leverage - S.D. { { { {
Redemption Freq. 0.299 0.036 0.290 0.070
Lockup Period -0.021 0.024 -0.023 0.038
Strategy Dummy
Convertible Bond 0.137 0.215 0.217 0.350
Dedicated Short -0.751 0.619 -0.604 0.455
Emerging Market 0.059 0.198 0.197 0.280
Equity M. Neutral -1.018 0.201 -0.740 0.344
Event Driven -0.049 0.176 0.092 0.253
Fixed Income 0.567 0.263 0.616 0.453
Fund of Funds -0.156 0.177 -0.151 0.257
Global Macro 1.287 0.206 1.099 0.345
Long/Short Eq. Hedge -0.377 0.159 -0.236 0.224
Managed Futures -0.091 0.183 -0.126 0.294
Multi-Strategy 0.318 0.194 0.496 0.283
Option Strategy -0.056 0.333 -0.012 0.467
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funds with longer redemption, compared with the funds with shorter redemption. This nd-
ing seems a little bit puzzling, since we expect that investors would prefer shorter redemption
restrictions. However, our estimation results also indicate that investors prefer funds with
shorter lockup periods. Therefore, we suspect that investors may prefer funds with shorter
lockup periods because they are not sure about the quality of the fund. However, once
investors observe the quality of the funds, they value longer redemption funds, so that the
fund manager can take any position without being anxious about liquidity.
6 Counterfactual Analysis
6.1 Overview of Policy Experiments
Our estimation results show that 20% of investors prefer the use of leverage, though on
average most evaluate it negatively. This observation implies that if the government imple-
mented a regulation that prevented hedge funds from using high leverage, depending on their
preferences, investors would reallocate their assets from leveraged hedge funds to other hedge
funds/nancial assets continue to invest in the same hedge funds. Therefore, we conduct
the following counterfactual experiment: If hedge funds were regulated by the government
to use lower leverage, how would investors change their behavior? Would investors continue
to investing in less leveraged funds or switch to other nancial assets?
To answer the question, we use the estimated model to predict the counterfactual demand
for hedge funds. More precisely, we limit maximum leverage usage to 1000%, 500%, 200%,
i.e.,
\new max leverage = maxfX;max leverageg;
where X = 1,000%, 500%, and 200%. The 200% limit comes from the policy proposal by
the European Commission. In order to illustrate the eects of regulation more clearly and
to explore its eectiveness, we simulate counterfactual demand for 500% and 1,000%.
Maintaining Assumptions Our current model does not include the supply side: we do
not model the hedge funds' behavior nor the funds' returns, and volatility as a function
of hedge fund leverage. Therefore, in the following experiments, we assume that (1) the
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returns and volatility of the hedge funds would not change, even though hedge funds could
no longer use high leverage, (2) hedge funds would not change their characteristics to attract
more investors, and (3) there would be no entry/exit. We discuss the issues caused by these
maintaining assumptions later.
6.2 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we rst look at the fund-level eects to understand investor behavior.
Then, in order to derive the implications for systemic risk, we demonstrate (1) aggregated-
level eects, (2) changes in concentration, and (3) changes in asset allocations for risky
strategies.
6.2.1 Understanding Investor Behavior
First, since we use micro data, we show micro-level eects when regulations are implemented.
Table 3 shows the fund-level changes. In this table, the rst through third columns show
the fund ID, the leverage ratio, and asset size, while the fourth through the sixth columns
show the changes in assets for the 1000%, 500%, and 200% cases respectively. The seventh
through ninth columns show the changes in leveraged assets for the respective 1000%, 500%,
and 200% cases.
Under 1,000% regulation, those funds that use more than 1,000% leverage would signi-
cantly lose their investors. For example, funds 2327 and 2568 would lose their shares almost
completely. Interestingly, at the same time, funds 5039 and 37320 would increase their asset
size, because investors who originally purchased highly leveraged funds (such as 2327, 2568,
and 35138) would shift their investment to these relatively high leveraged funds. In other
words, funds 5039 and 37320 can be seen as good substitutes for funds 2327, 2568, and
35138, under 1,000% regulation.
Moreover, under 500% regulation, we observe the same eect, though now more funds
that use high leverage ratios would suer under this regulation. However, those funds that
use about 600% leverage would not face a serious decrease in investment, say 30% on aver-
age, compared to the funds that use more than 1,000% which would completely lose their
shares. This dierence can be explained by the fact that investors who invested in very high
leveraged funds wanted to invest in such funds. Under 200%, these aforementioned patterns
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Table 3: Regulation Eects by Individual Fund Level
Leverage Asset Changes in Assets
Fund ID Ratio Size 1000% 500% 200%
2327 80 30.01 -29.96 -30.00 -30.00
2568 40 293.90 -289.68 -293.17 -293.68
35138 20 97.44 -85.25 -95.35 -96.80
751 12 223.99 -92.12 -201.33 -217.02
1479 12 840.27 -320.40 -750.93 -812.80
3168 10 1000.00 1.42 -827.91 -947.09
1201 9 33.86 0.05 -26.00 -31.44
5039 9 5792.83 7.95 -4449.00 -5379.64
43418 8 667.82 0.87 -453.47 -601.91
37320 7 9887.47 12.07 -5367.38 -8497.68
43520 7 133.00 0.16 -72.20 -114.31
1411 6 69.81 0.08 -22.92 -55.40
1994 6 637.69 0.70 -209.37 -505.99
35348 6 1020.00 1.12 -334.89 -809.35
34259 2 366.63 0.06 1.11 1.95
35561 2 51.37 0.01 0.16 0.27
75857 1 510.90 0.01 0.16 0.29
76639 1 11.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Note: The unit for the numbers in the fourth through ninth columns is $mil-
lions.
are strengthened with more shifting to less leveraged funds.
6.2.2 Implications for Systemic Risk
In the previous subsection, we sought to understand investors' behavior under counterfactual
scenarios. Now, having this understanding of investors' behavior, we discuss and derive
implications for systemic risk.
Macro Measurement: Aggregate-Level Changes Table 4 gives an overview of the
macro-level eects of regulation. The rst two rows, labeled as data, show the fraction of
assets in the hedge fund industry and other nancial markets (outside options). In the third
and fourth rows, we show the fraction of assets in the hedge fund industry and other nancial
markets under 1,000% regulation, and so on.
According to Table 4, for example, in 2007, the hedge funds industry collected 0.46%
of assets, and other nancial markets such as mutual funds and saving accounts collected
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Table 4: Simulation Results: Overview
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Data
In Hedge Funds 0.46% 0.48% 0.48% 0.39% 0.33%
Outside 99.54% 99.52% 99.52% 99.61% 99.67%
1000% Regulation
In Hedge Funds 0.46% 0.48% 0.48% 0.39% 0.33%
Outside 99.54% 99.52% 99.52% 99.61% 99.67%
500% Regulation
In Hedge Funds 0.43% 0.46% 0.47% 0.38% 0.32%
Outside 99.57% 99.54% 99.53% 99.62% 99.68%
200% Regulation
In Hedge Funds 0.40% 0.45% 0.45% 0.36% 0.30%
Outside 99.60% 99.55% 99.55% 99.64% 99.70%
99.54%.14 The next two rows show the results under 1000% regulation, and we can see there
is almost no eect, since only 1% of hedge funds use more than 1000% leverage. However,
as regulation gets tighter, the assets shift from the hedge fund industry to other nancial
products, since hedge funds would no longer attractive for those investors who value the use
of leverage.
In order to show this result more graphically, we focus on 2007 and demonstrate the
change in total assets under management in the hedge industry in Figure 7. If there is no
regulation, the assets under management in this industry are roughly about 240.9 billion
dollars. However, if the government imposes a 1,000% cap, only about 1% of hedge funds
are aected by this regulation and the total assets under management would not change
dramatically, as seen in the bar at the right end. If the government imposes a 500% cap,
about 5% of hedge funds need to lower their leverage and the total amount of assets would
be 224.4 billion dollars, implying that total assets would decrease by 6.8%. Moreover, the
government imposes a 200% cap, about 11.1% of hedge funds need to lower their leverage,
and the amount of total assets would be 221.0 billion dollars, implying the total assets would
decrease by 8.3%.
14This number for the hedge fund industry seems small, because we only use funds located in the U.S. and
U.S. dollar funds that reported monthly returns and estimated assets. Also, notice that the Lipper TASS
database covers approximately 30% of hedge funds. Therefore, if we could include all hedge funds in the
world, the number should be much bigger.
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Figure 7: Change in Total Asset Holdings by Hedge Fund Industry
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Micro Measurement 1: Changes in Concentration As we described in Section 2, one
important factor that aects systemic risk is concentration. Therefore, after the simulation,
we sort the hedge funds by asset size and plot the cumulative assets distribution again as in
Figure 8. The right and left panels of Figure 8 demonstrate asset size concentration without
and with multiplying by leverage, respectively.
Figure 8: Market Concentration without/with Multiplying Leverage
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As the left panel of Figure 8 shows, the relative asset size concentration would not change,
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since there are not many funds aected by the regulation. Interestingly, however, the right
panel of Figure 8, which describes the cumulative asset distribution after multiplying by
leverage, shows much larger changes compared to the right panel. This result implies that
the asset distribution is much smoother than before. The reason for these results is as follows:
If the government regulated the hedge funds' leverage, some investors who value hedge funds'
leverage positively would lose interest in this industry. Among them, some investors might
continue to invest in other hedge funds, but most of them would likely shift their investments
to other nancial products. On the other hand, most of the investors who do not prefer high
leveraged funds would start purchasing less leveraged regulated funds after the regulation
was implemented. These two eects oset each other and, as a consequence, we do not see
any change in the cumulative distribution.
However, if we want to take into account the leveraged asset amount, we also need to
multiply by the leverage. In the data, a hedge fund use up to 8,000% of leverage, but now
these funds can use only 1,000%, 500% or 200%. Therefore, the leveraged-asset distribution
should be smoother, implying that many funds have similar managed assets unless they have
better fund-specic eects, denoted by j in our model.
Micro Measurement 2: Changes in Asset Allocations for Risky Strategies Ta-
ble 5 shows our simulation results by strategy. Every number displayed in this table is a
percentage. For example, the data show that, in 2007, the percentage of assets in hedge
funds that use a Convertible Bond strategy was about 0.02%. Under the 200% regulation,
however, assets in funds that use the same strategy would decrease by 0.01% and would be
0.01%.
Since it is a little bit tough to see the eects in Table 5, we also demonstrate our results
more graphically in Figure 9. On the left side, the top, middle and bottom panels show how
much investment each strategy would garner under 1,000%, 500% and 200% regulations,
respectively. Similarly, on the right side, the top, middle and bottom panels show how much
of leveraged assets each strategy would manage under 1,000%, 500% and 200% regulations,
respectively.
From the top row of the two gures, we can again see that the impact of 1,000% regula-
tion would not be so large. Even if we take leverage into account, most strategies would not
be aected, except for xed income. However, as regulation gets tighter, regulation eects
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become clearer. For example, funds that use a Global Macro or Multi-Strategy would de-
crease their assets under management signicantly. Moreover, if we take into account their
use of leverage, funds that use Convertible, Emerging Market, Equity Neutral, Fixed Income,
Global Macro, and Multi-Strategy would signicantly decrease their shares. As pointed out
in Section 2, we dene Fixed Income, Global Macro and Multi-Strategy as risky strategies,
and it is clear that these strategies would lose their shares, implying that systemic risk would
be reduced signicantly under 500% or 200% regulation.
As a consequence of our analysis of the three systemic risk factors and macro-level eects,
we conclude that regulations would lead to lower demand in the hedge fund industry, in
particular, highly leveraged funds and risky strategies, which, in turn, would reduce systemic
risk.
6.3 Some Potential Problems
Even though our simulation results show that the demand for hedge funds would decrease as
a consequence of leverage regulation, there are a couple of concerns about our methodology.
Therefore, in this subsection, we summarize these potential problems in evaluating such a
counterfactual policy.
Hedge Fund Behaviors In our estimation, hedge funds are not explicitly modeled, and
thus, our results cannot take into account their changes in behavior. For example, as a
result of the implementation of leverage regulation, some hedge funds might exit from the
market, because prots for some of their strategies highly depend on the use of leverage.
Also, they might change other characteristics such as redemption periods or incentive fees.
Furthermore, hedge funds may purchase riskier assets after the regulations because they
can no longer use high leverage. In such cases, the demand structure would be changed,
corresponding to hedge funds' behavior; so we cannot have such equilibrium eects.
Leverage and Performance Moreover, our model implicitly assumes that hedge funds'
performance would not be changed after regulation. It is, however, possible that performance
would be changed; in particular, we expect that performance would be worse because hedge
funds can no longer take highly leveraged positions. Then, observing the lower performance,
investors would shift their assets from hedge funds to other nancial assets. Therefore, our
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Figure 9: Regulation Eects by Strategy
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assumption that performance would be constant before and after regulation might cause
some problems.15
15We will take this eect into account in a future revision.
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Systemic Measurement To measure systemic risk, we only consider the hedge fund
industry structure from the view of investor behavior. However, hedge funds aect nancial
markets in dierent ways. Leveraged hedge fund failures induce re sales of illiquid assets,
turmoils in particular markets, destabilization to large commercial banks, and credit crunches
in funding markets. Due to data shortage, we cannot consider these factors, but these are
also important for systemic risk measurements.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies investors' hedge fund choice using a framework estimating dierentiated
product demand. It further assesses the eects of proposed regulations that aim to reduce
systemic risk throughout nancial system. Our estimation results show that 20% of investors
prefer leveraged funds, while the rest do not. Using the estimated model, we then ask the
question of what would happen if the government regulated hedge funds' use of leverage, as
suggested by the Financial Stability Board in 2012. Our policy simulations demonstrate that
the restriction of leverage would signicantly decrease demand for hedge funds, in particular,
for highly leveraged funds. Our ndings, therefore, suggest that the proposed regulation of
the use of leverage by hedge funds would reduce systemic risk.
For policy implications, this paper nds that 20% of investors have a \risk appetite."
However, if regulators discipline their appetites, there would be signicantly less systemic
risk: the industry would be less concentrated, the risky strategy proportion of the industry
would be reduced, and total industry asset would decrease. As the leverage limits become
tighter, those safer features would be reinforced, because investors would signicantly move
their assets from large, risky, high leveraged funds to an outside option or to small, safe,
less leveraged hedge funds. As a caveat, this paper studies the regulation eects viewed
from investor behaviors. Certainly, one interesting direction to continue this line of research
would be to study how hedge funds would change their strategies and use of leverage.
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Table 6: Estimation Results 2: Average Leverage
Logit Model Random Coef. Model
Variables Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Constant -14.207 0.251 -13.889 0.467
Rate of Return t  1 14.438 1.751 14.156 2.875
Rate of Return t  2 13.420 1.845 12.621 3.015
Rate of Return t  3 9.531 1.968 10.150 3.087
S.D. Retrun t  1 -1.163 1.509 -1.344 2.578
S.D. Retrun t  2 -5.288 1.711 -5.642 2.844
S.D. Retrun t  3 -9.170 1.780 -8.105 2.760
Year Dummy 2008 -0.296 0.084 -0.254 0.133
Year Dummy 2009 0.093 0.098 0.109 0.155
Year Dummy 2010 0.044 0.098 0.028 0.156
Year Dummy 2011 0.090 0.107 0.073 0.165
Management Fee -0.058 0.034 -0.069 0.107
Incentive Fee -0.009 0.006 -0.020 0.012
Maximum Leverage - Mean { { { {
Maximum Leverage - S.D. { { { {
Aevrage Leverage - Mean 0.274 0.088 -1.207 0.185
Average Leverage - S.D. { { 1.608 0.346
Redemption Freq. 0.297 0.036 0.279 0.070
Lockup Period -0.023 0.024 -0.023 0.038
Strategy Dummy
Convertible Bond 0.123 0.216 0.175 0.362
Dedicated Short -0.758 0.619 -0.821 0.457
Emerging Market 0.047 0.198 0.048 0.284
Equity M. Neutral -1.046 0.201 -0.801 0.344
Event Driven -0.062 0.176 -0.045 0.253
Fixed Income 0.512 0.263 0.349 0.455
Fund of Funds -0.185 0.176 -0.319 0.256
Global Macro 1.280 0.206 1.083 0.345
Long/Short Eq. Hedge -0.401 0.159 -0.390 0.225
Managed Futures -0.134 0.182 -0.233 0.295
Multi Strategy 0.292 0.194 0.436 0.285
Option Strategy -0.119 0.332 -0.076 0.470
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